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Abstract. In the context of the American federalism, integrated parties provide the necessary 
coordination mechanism for state and federal politicians to be electorally successful. This 
argument rests on the assumption that voters are able to observe the benefits of voting a straight 
ticket. We test for individual level explanations by using CCES data. Moreover, we measure the 
so-called ‘two-sided’ coattail effects in concurrent multilevel elections in the U.S. since 1960. 
By using a simultaneous equation model, we estimate the reciprocal relationship between 
presidential and gubernatorial vote shares at the state level. While we find no consistent 
presidential coattails, we reveal robust and significant gubernatorial coattail effects on state-
level presidential vote, underscoring the role of multilevel forces within parties in democratic 
federations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
These days, only eleven of the fifty gubernatorial races for state level executives in the United 
States are held on the first Tuesday in November, during Presidential election years1. The rest 
have gradually moved to off-year elections. The number of states electing their Governor in the 
‘on-year’ started to decline dramatically in the beginning of the second half of last century 
(Figure 1) – specially among those states holding gubernatorial elections every two-years – as a 
consequence of the decision of separating the state’s chief executive elections from the federal 
arena (Tompkins, 1987). This process of electoral differentiation was highly motivated by the 
seemingly observation that Governors were riding the so-called ‘coattails’ of their party’s 
candidate for President (Bibby, 1983: 116). The typical argument was that the effect of 
presidential coattails would constrain gubernatorial competition. By this logic races for the 
governorship would be dominated by either heightened partisan divisions or the importance of 
national issues rather than issues specific to a given state. Whatever the reason, as Tompkins 
(1988) pointed out, many states acted as these concerns were realized in electoral experience by 
moving to isolate their gubernatorial elections from presidential contests2. 
 
(FIGURE 1 HERE) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Data, replication codes and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results 
in this paper will be made available online. 
2 ‘At New Jersey’s constitutional convention in 1947, Governor Alfred Driscoll argued ‘the 
importance of a gubernatorial election merits an election that will not be overshadowed by a 
national contest for the Presidency. The problems confronting the State are frequently distinct 
from those confronting the nation’ (Proceedings of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention, 
1947) (Bishop and Hatch, 2014. Perception of State Parties and Voting in Statewide Elections. 
Typescript). 
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The separation of these executive elections has largely contributed to a gap in the 
analysis of their electoral interactions (Tompkins, 1988). Paradoxically, however, ever since the 
New Deal, the roles of state and national governments have become increasingly connected. 
The executive officials of the U.S. political system, that is, the President and Governors of the 
fifty states engage in constant bargaining, while resources flow vertically on a regular basis. 
Integrated parties, at least in theory, have been recognized as those political 
organizations most conducive to federal stability (Filippov et al., 2004; Bednar, 2009). As Dyck 
(1991: 29) states, ‘if a political party functions more or less successfully at both levels of 
government and if the relations between the two levels are generally close, it can be called an 
integrated party’. In the context of American federal institutions, these organizations assure the 
survival and success of co-partisans by coordinating the incentives of local and national elites. 
As a result, this mutual dependence generates a long-term electoral coalition within the party 
and discourages intraparty conflict. Empirically, this two-way relationship implies that we are 
likely to observe ‘two-sided’ coattail effects (Zudenkova, 2011) as the possible observable 
outcome if the hypothesized correlation of incentives among politicians exists. This would 
mean that while a President’s performance affects a Governor’s reelection chances, a 
Governor's performance could also affect how the President is evaluated in a given state. 
Moreover, as Broockman (2009: 422) suggests, ‘two-sided’ coattail effects appear to be the 
logical expectation of the presidential coattail literature: ‘if voters engage the availability 
heuristic in American elections, there should be spillover effects both up and down the ballot’. 
Put it differently, ‘there is nothing about the heuristic voting conceptually that indicates only 
presidential evaluation should tend to inform Congressional evaluations rather than the reverse 
too’. 
This paper brings both, integrated parties and coattails’ literatures together, in order to 
explore the existence of reciprocal coattail effects in the context of American political 
institutions; that is, two-way spillover effects between same-party candidates running for 
different multilevel concurrent elections. To that end, we start by briefly discussing the role and 
characteristics of integrated parties in a long lasting federation as the United States. Then, we 
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examine whether this relationship exists empirically. To conduct this analysis, we examine 
straight versus split ticket voting. We pay special attention to the role that partisanship and 
performance evaluations play in determining how integrated parties operate as an electoral cue 
for voters facing simultaneous elections. Consistent with the studies of coattails in Congress, we 
identify and measure the possible existence of reciprocal coattail effects between same party 
presidential and gubernatorial candidates in on-year elections since the beginning of the sixties. 
Results endorse the expectations of this paper at the individual level and provide mixed but 
insightful results at the aggregate with regard to the multilevel organization of political parties 
in decentralized contexts. Finally, we review some of the implications of our results by 
emphasizing the relevance of exploring these synergic effects. 
 
2. Federalism, Integrated Political Parties and Candidates’ Mutual Dependence 
 
Since Wheare (1946) and Riker’s (1964) seminal works on federalism, political parties and their 
organization in multilevel government systems have been increasingly accepted, as the key 
variable to understand, not only the outcome of elites’ bargaining, but also its stability and 
viability in the long term. As Riker asserts, ‘the cause of variations in the degree of 
centralization (or peripheralization) in the constitutional structure of federalism is the variation 
in the degree of party centralization’ (1964: 129). Hence, for Riker, federal stability and 
coherence would depend on two kinds of relationships with respect to parties: (I) the degree to 
which one party (electorally) controls both levels of government; and (II) the degree to which 
each potential governing party at the national level controls its partisan associates at the level of 
constituent governments (1964: 131). Relying on Riker's logic, Filippov et al. suggest that 
relations in a federal state are characterized by interactions within the party and an integrated 
party would be the type of organization most conducive to federal stability (2004: 190). An 
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integrated party3 refers to a party in which politicians at one level of government bear an 
organizational relationship to politicians at other levels, as well as politicians at the same level.  
This linkage between the political fortunes of federal and state officials is what accounts 
for the continual success of American federalism (Kramer, 2000). Two critical features of 
American parties have shaped how they operate in this federal system. On one hand, they 
prioritize the goal of getting people elected. On the other hand, they are decentralized, and 
remain broad and flexible ‘confederations of national, state and local cadres whose most 
conspicuous features are flabby organization and slack discipline’ (ibid. 278-279). This 
combination of characteristics is what has created, ‘a political culture in which members of local, 
state, and national networks are encouraged, indeed expected, to work for the election of 
candidates at every level’ 4. 
Still, what creates those cooperative electoral incentives between politicians in this 
multilevel scenario? Here, we argue that local and national politicians depend on each other for 
success because of the electoral relevance of the party-label and the governmental 
interdependence of Presidents and Governors. 
The classic view of ‘dual’ or ‘layer cake’ federalism, understood as the distinct and 
non-overlapping realms of state and federal authority has usually served to distinguish 
federalism in United States from most other federations5. Lately, most scholars conclude that 
the post-New Deal era raised a new type of federal ideal, the so-called ‘marble cake’ federalism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The concept of integration in American political parties arises as a theoretical response to the 
institutional challenges faced by the responsible parties model (Cutler, 1998); that is, the 
paradox of the existing potential difficulties for unified control of government in the U.S. (the 
horizontal and vertical division of powers), and yet, the actual stability of its federalism. 
4 Kramer paraphrasing William H. Riker in 1987, The development of American Federalism. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 84-85.  
5 Several regional governments are funded primarily with grants and loans from the federal 
government rather than by autonomous local taxation. 
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with governmental responsibilities intertwined among the national government, states and 
localities (Volden, 2005). Grodzins (1966), who coined the term for the first time, argues that 
‘no important activity in the United States is the exclusive province of one of the levels, not 
even what may be regarded as the most national of national functions, such as foreign relations; 
not even the most local of local functions, such as police protection and park maintenance’ 
(1966: 8). The shift in the distributional characteristics of the federal system was rooted in the 
attempts of Congress to exert much broader authority over the national transportation system 
and more generally, over the economy during late nineteenth century. However, most federal 
efforts to influence state governments, in the form of federal grants or federal effective 
regulation, would come later, with FDR’s pulse to the Supreme Court and the posterior success 
of civil rights movement, especially after Brown v. Broad of Education (Peterson, 1995). 
The new interdependent federal scenarios, in which Democrats and Republicans have 
adapted their strategy and party organizations, has far from weakened the states’ position in the 
overall federal setting, strengthen their voice in national politics. Because the federal 
government depends on state administrators to oversee or implement so many of its programs, 
states have been able to use their position in the administrative system to protect their 
institutional interests in Congress (Kramer, 2000). As an example, it has been recently 
demonstrated that states whose Governor belongs to the same party of the President receive 
more federal funds (Larcinese et al., 2006). Following Riker’s logic on the transfer of federal 
relations to relations within the party itself, in our opinion, this observable interdependence 
would explain the cooperative electoral incentives within same party elites in the American 
multilevel scenario. Consequently, since the party label can be thought of as a public good for 
all politicians at federal and state levels (Cox and McCubbins, 2005), we follow Aldrich and 
others when asserting that the two major parties in the U.S. provide more support than any other 
organization for all but a very few candidates for national and state offices (1995; Kramer, 
2000; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004).  
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3. The Effect of Integrated Parties on Voting Behavior 
 
For the intertwined incentives of co-partisans and integrated party strategies to matter at the 
polls though voters should be able to recognize the benefits of having same party candidates 
holding executive offices at different territorial levels. As the comparative literature working on 
‘vertical clarity of responsibilities’ has concluded, federalism (and decentralization, more 
generally) makes the accuracy of policy attributions at the individual level more difficult (Cutler, 
2004; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010).  
In any case, we believe that in an election in which voters confront scores of candidates 
about whom they have varying levels of information, the essential commodity possessed by 
candidates at lower levels is partisan label shared with popular candidates for national office 
(Filippov et al., 2004: 191). Hence, party identification, regardless as to whether it operates as a 
long-standing psychological attachment (Campbell et al., 1960) or as a ‘running-tally’ of 
retrospective evaluation of parties’ performance (Fiorina, 1981), works as a necessary shortcut 
for voters when holding the multilevel governments accountable by exercising their electoral 
choice. Therefore, our story, in its more basic application to the individual level, is a simple 
one: partisan voters casting a straight ticket ballot when considering multiple offices 
simultaneously. To our knowledge, few systematic empirical researches exist addressing the 
question of straight/split ticket voting from an intergovernmental and vertical perspective6. 
Therefore, our research builds on the specific body of theoretical and empirical work 
concerning individual level explanations for voting behavior in simultaneous elections. 
 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As remote exceptions, De Vries and Tarrance (1972) and Soss and Canon (1995) wrote about 
individual level explanations for Governor-Senator ticket splitting. More recently, in the case of 
state and federal level legislatures, Bishop and Hats (2012).  
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Table 1 shows the voting strategy of panel survey respondents from the Cooperative 
Congressional Elections Study (CCES) 7  in New Hampshire, Utah, and Vermont. New 
Hampshire and Vermont are the only states that currently have two-year electoral cycles. The 
2010 Gubernatorial Elections were an exception in Utah8, where gubernatorial elections are 
usually held simultaneously with Presidential elections. The panel data gives us the chance to 
compare the behavior of same respondents voting in on and off-year elections. As one might 
expect, straight ticket voting for both major parties was clearly the most popular strategy in both 
moments (87.59% in 2010, 92,14% in 2012). However, the descriptive statistics in the table 
might also confirm that several other conditions prevented voters from behaving in such a way. 
For instance, the level of ticket splitting during 2010 was almost 5 points higher than in 2012. 
This fact suggests that factors such as the non-concurrency of elections or the idea of 
ideological balancing (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Erikson and Filippov, 2001; Erikson et al., 
2012) could be affecting these results. For example, almost 50 per cent of those who split their 
ticket in 2010 voted a straight ticket in 2012.  
Since the aim of this paper is to study coattails during concurrent elections, the 2008 
and 2012 CCES9 repeated surveys are used to model the individual decision to vote a straight 
ticket. Even if on-year elections are a much higher profile election types in terms of the 
available political information, and this causes ticket splitting to occur at a lower rate, we 
control for those individual, political, and institutional conditions that would promote such 
behavior in our analysis. 
Individual characteristics refer to those respondents’ features already identified by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ansolabehere, Stephen, COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 2012: 
COMMON CONTENT. [Computer File] Release 1: April 15, 2013. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University [producer] http://cces.gov.harvard.edu 
8 As a consequence of Governor Jon Huntsman’s resignation on 11th August, 2009.  
9 11 states are represented in 2008 and 2012 (9 on-year states: DE, IN, MO, ND, NC, WV, MT, 
WA and UT; and 2 two-year states: VT and NH).  
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scholars as generating ticket splitting propensity (Roscoe, 2003). Among socio-demographics, 
we control for age, gender, race, education and income of the respondents following the classic 
claim of De Vries and Tarrance (1972: 61) about how the ticket splitter is ‘slightly younger, 
somewhat more educated, somewhat more white-collar and more suburban than the typical 
middle class voter’. We also account for the role of respondents’ political interest even if, as 
literature suggests, the effects of this variable tend to be mixed (Beck et al., 1992). 
Political conditions refer to the effect of ideology at state level. According to Erikson et 
al. (1989), in the context of Presidential and Congressional elections, variation in the median 
voter across districts would make candidates of the same party to support different positions, 
depending on the spatial location of the median voter in that district. Consequently, the highest 
proportion of split ticket voting outcomes should be observed in ideologically extreme districts 
(Groffman et al., 2000). While most of these arguments have been developed at the aggregate, 
the most likely location of incumbents of a given party varies with the ideological make up of 
the constituency (ibid. 37). As a result, we approximate this measure at the individual level by 
accounting for the absolute ideological distance between incumbent President and Governor as 
reported in 2012 by each respondent10.  
Finally, we identify as institutional conditions two state-level characteristics that 
remain constant in the analysis, working as necessary fixed-effects: gubernatorial incumbency 
and straight-ticket ballot. Incumbency, as a candidate variable, has been identified, at least at the 
aggregate level, as a circumstance increasing the likelihood of observing ticket splitting (Burden 
and Kimball, 1998) while straight-ticket ballot accounts for those states11 in which voting 
machines facilitate choosing the same party for every contested office, without considering 
other individual candidates out of the chosen ticket (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Beck, 1997).  
In line with our theoretical argumentation, we are interested in measuring what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The question about the ideological location of candidates in a left right dimension is missing 
in the CCES 2008 Survey. 
11 Three in total: Indiana, North Carolina and West Virginia.  
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motivates intergovernmental executive straight ticket voting after controlling for the 
aforementioned conditions promoting individuals’ split of the vote. Since incentives and 
electoral fates of co-partisans are interdependent, we argue that voters adopt a joint performance 
evaluation rule rather than an individual one (Zudenkova, 2011: 1653), punishing or rewarding 
the co-partisan candidates running for federal and state level executive offices. So, the general 
expectation here is that the individual partisan intensity and the approval of the incumbents (at 
both levels) will increase the probability of a voter choosing a straight ticket.  
Consequently, we expect partisanship (a folded-measure of intensity, 0 to 4) to have a 
consistent, positive and significant effect on straight ticket voting. Naturally, we do not deny the 
possibility of observing the highest percentage of ticket splitters among moderate or 
independent voters (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Beck et al., 1992; Soss and Canon, 1995; Born, 
2000). Moreover, we presume that the probability of casting a straight party ballot will be also 
affected by evaluations on the performance of incumbents and their party affiliation. Therefore, 
we expect approval of incumbents to have a significant effect on straight ticket voting 
conditional on the party of the incumbent. In this sense, we follow Mondak and McCurley, who 
argue that coattail effects stem from the fact that voters search for efficiency in decision-making 
by turning to simple cues (partisanship and evaluation of performance) rather than engaging in 
an extensive deliberative process (1994: 153). 
 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
The dependent variable is taken from the CCES questions about Presidential and 
Gubernatorial vote choices. Voters who cast a straight ballot are coded ‘1’ while voters who 
cast ballots for two candidates from different parties are coded ‘0’. Since our argument is 
inherently partisan, the dependent variable needs to take into account the patterns for straight 
versus split ticket voting. Thus, the samples have been divided into Democratic and Republican 
presidential voters, and the models are used to predict whether voters within these groups vote 
for the gubernatorial candidate of the same party. Therefore, the DV for the first group is coded 
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‘1’ for DD voting and ‘0’ DOther voting. For the second group, it is coded ‘1’ for RR voting 
and ‘0’ for ROther voting (Roscoe, 2003). Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we 
specify probit models to conduct our analysis. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 2. Where statistically 
significant, the coefficients for the socio-demographic variables suggest that older, wealthier 
and politically interested people tend to vote straight tickets more. Yet, the results are mixed 
and unstable. Incumbency and straight-ticket ballot show a more consistent and expected 
negative pattern on the probability of voting straight, though they fail to reach significance in all 
models. This is not the case for our measure of the ideological distance between Governor and 
President. As predicted, it has a negative and significant effect in 2012 suggesting that the 
bigger the difference between the perceived political position of the Governor and the President, 
the lower the probability of voting for the same party candidates. This unique and robust finding 
contributes to the confirmation of state ideological extremism as a clear threat for the electoral 
prospects of integrated parties. 
 
(FIGURE 2 HERE) 
 
Partisanship, which remains significant in all the specified models, confirms that the 
stronger the partisan attachment to one of the two main political parties in the U.S. the higher 
the probability of casting a straight ticket. In regard to Presidential Approval, we observe a 
significant reaction of respondents to the party change in the Oval Office. The results confirm 
that Democratic presidential voters who expressed higher levels of pre-election approval for 
President Bush in 2008 were less likely to cast straight tickets. By contrast, voters who 
expressed higher levels of approval of Obama in 2012 were more likely to cast a straight ballot 
(Models 1 & 3). This pattern holds in the case of Republican voters too. 
 
(FIGURE 3 HERE) 
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Figure 3 shows the effects of the interaction of Gubernatorial Approval and Partisan 
Match in our models. Partisan Match is a dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ when the 
incumbent Governor shares party affiliation with a respondent’s choice for President. Hence, in 
the case of a voter that supported Obama in 2012, Partisan Match will take the value of 1 when 
the incumbent Governor in the respondent’s state is also a Democrat. Given the characteristics 
of the constituent terms of the interaction (an ordinal and a dummy variables), we think that 
predicted probabilities, rather than marginal effects, provide a more meaningful understanding 
of what is actually happening in this specific relationship. As a result, we show the effect of 
Gubernatorial Approval on the probability of straight ticket voting conditional on the party of 
the incumbent.  
Graphs above only show the effect for democratic presidential vote samples but the 
relationship also holds in the republican case. As we can infer from them, the marginal effect 
(which is the difference between both predicted probabilities) of increasing gubernatorial 
approval when the governor is democratic will be positive and significant, for lower levels of 
approval in 2008 (Figure 3.a) and for the whole range of approval values in 2012 (Figure 3.b). 
Clearly, as the approval of a democratic Governor increases, the chances of voting for a 
democratic straight ticket also increase.  
 
4. Two-sided coattails at the aggregate level 
 
Previous section has empirically confirmed the underlying individual level assumption in our 
theory. Then, if voters develop a joint performance evaluation rule when casting their ballot, it 
seems plausible to track such a voting pattern in the aggregate by accounting for the so-called 
‘two-sided’ coattail effects (Zudenkova, 2011: 1653) between the presidential and co-partisan 
gubernatorial candidates. Instead of only observing the classic unidirectional effect from the 
presidential side, it should be also possible to account for an additional theoretical implication, 
that is, the so-called ‘reverse’ coattails from same party gubernatorial candidates. Strictly 
speaking, presidential election outcomes could also be influenced, at the state level, by the 
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presence of particularly strong (or weak) gubernatorial candidates. 
Coattails are generally defined in literature as a spillover effect that describes situations 
in which an election for one office has an impact on an election for another one. More 
concretely, a coattail effect is defined as the tendency of a popular candidate at one level of 
government to attract votes to candidates from the same political party for other levels of 
government. Presidential coattail effects on congressional elections have been extensively 
scrutinized and results appear to be mixed. While abundant scholarship shows, empirically, the 
degree to which presidential coattails affect congressional elections in the U.S. (Born, 1984; 
Campbell, 1986), these effects have also been contested because of the declining impact over 
time (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983). Additionally, it has been argued that the observed levels of 
coattail effects are conditional on candidacy status and quality (Mondak, 1993; Flemming, 
1995) and on voters’ attitudes (McCurley and Mondak, 1994). 
With regard to the multilevel connection of executive offices, based on the analysis of 
several surveys, scholars have been able to show the effect of evaluations of the President on 
voting behavior during off-year gubernatorial elections. Presidential approval does not only 
affect the results of electoral races for the U.S Senate and House of Representatives; evaluations 
of President’s performance can even influence voters’ decisions to vote for or against same 
party Governor candidates, describing what has been commonly known as the ‘national 
referendum hypothesis’ (Piereson, 1975; Chubb, 1988; Simon, 1989; King, 2001). These results 
though, have been challenged by those suggesting the existence of an economic voting 
hypothesis; in short, Governors’, as state executives, are held accountable for the perceived state 
economic conditions (Atkeson and Partin, 1995; Niemi et al., 1995; Svoboda, 1995).  
As previously described, the decision to ‘insulate state elections from national trends’ 
(Bibby, 1983) has diluted the attempts to analyze the possible impact of national forces on state 
level races during on-year elections (Tompkins, 1988). A few studies have approached the 
possibility of observing gubernatorial coattails on federal level Senatorial contests (Burns, 
1999) or State legislative elections (Campbell, 1986; Hogan, 2005). With respect to two-sided 
coattails though, Calvert and Ferejohn (1983), and Broockman’s (2009) work on Presidential 
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and House candidates remain still as the few attempts in literature. Therefore, the theoretical 
and empirical propositions of this paper are novel by themselves. For their satisfactory analysis, 
we here follow Tompkins’ (1988), who suggested that the study of the bidirectional causation 
between the President and Governors ‘requires a substantial model of presidential election 
outcomes at the state level (which has yet to be developed in the literature at this writing)’. 
 
4.1 Testing for two-sided coattail effects: A non-recursive model 
 
The high salience of presidential campaigns provides readily accessible information concerning 
candidates to voters. Presidential coattail heuristic is more or less effective depending on the 
nature of gubernatorial race competition; its influence should be potentially more perceivable in 
open-seat contests than in those with an incumbent. However, unlike presidential incumbency, 
gubernatorial incumbency is a diverse political practice that depends on the heterogeneous 
design of state executives’ term limits (see Table 3). Accordingly, it is not rare to see an open-
seat race with a newcomer running against a former Governor, who had to leave the office due 
to specific term limits. What we argue here is that, depending on the election, voters hold 
differing levels of information about presidential and gubernatorial candidates, and 
consequently, attitudes toward gubernatorial candidates can be sometimes strong enough to 
overwhelm presidential coattails, and even, reverse them. For this reason, we focus our analysis 
on those 26 states that since 1960 have had, at least, one of their gubernatorial elections in a 
presidential election year. 
 
(TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
To avoid omitted variable bias and test the proposition that ceteris paribus, more 
popular congress members help their party´s presidential candidates, Broockman (2009) relied 
on the use of quasi-experimental designs to obtain estimates of the causal effects of incumbency. 
By considering incumbency as near-randomly assigned around the 50% threshold in two-party 
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vote, the author develops a Regression Discontinuity Design to test for the spillover benefits 
that a presidential candidate could obtain from his/her congressional counterparts’ previous 
victories. Although we found this approach particularly compelling, there are two main 
justifications for our decision of choosing a different modeling strategy. First, as shown in Table 
3, there exists a high degree of heterogeneity regarding state level institutions, limiting 
gubernatorial terms in various ways, and thus, impeding any attempt to parcel out the effect of 
gubernatorial incumbency in a quasi-experimental way. Second, theoretically, this paper argues 
that there exists a reciprocal electoral relationship between same party multilevel candidates. 
Empirically, there are different ways to measure these types of bidirectional relations; one of 
them could be the Simultaneous Equation Model (SiEM), that is, a system of equations with 
more than one outcome variable. In this study, we build a non-recursive two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) 12 model with a feedback loop between two endogenous dependent variables13: on one 
hand, the vote percentage of a presidential candidate at the state level (Y), and on the other hand, 
the vote percentage of the same party state executive candidate (Z). We do this by first 
estimating initial equations for Y and Z separately, regressing them on those exogenous 
variables hypothesized to predict these outcome variables (incumbency, lagged vote share, and 
campaign spending), and then by including both predicted new variables in the full models. The 
predicted values of presidential vote shares resulting from these regressions are no longer 
correlated with the error terms in the equations for gubernatorial vote shares, and vice versa 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 One of the key assumptions in OLS is that the explanatory variables and error terms are not 
correlated; this is violated in non-recursive models, and using OLS estimation can produce both 
bias and inefficiency in statistical results. According to Paxton et al. (2011), 2SLS and 3SLS 
provide identical results when the covariances among the equation disturbances are all zero or 
when they are exactly identified. The difference is between having a full-information or a 
limited-information model. So, reported results in Table 4 hold after running the model by using 
the 3SLS estimator. 
13 The endogeneity between the two dependent variables confirmed by a Hausman Test. 
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(Sovey and Green, 2011). 
 
(FIGURE 4 HERE) 
4.2 Data 
 
We use state-level data14 from 1960 to 2012 that includes the two-party vote share for Governor 
and President. As it follows from Figure 1, the number of states in the sample with on-year 
gubernatorial elections drastically decreases from 1960 to 1980, stabilizing after that point. 
Figure 4 provides the path diagram of our non-recursive model. There are two endogenous 
variables responding to each other: state level same-party vote shares for presidential and 
gubernatorial candidates in an election at time ‘t’. Estimating short-term coattails requires 
controlling for long-term electoral effects first (Magar, 2012: 387). In order to do so and thus, 
account for parties’ normal vote at state level, we introduce the lag of each party’s vote share in 
both elections at ‘t-1’. Other than this control, we have two excluded and one common 
exogenous variable, and as a result of including these variables the model is specified, and over-
identified.  
Candidate Incumbency is a dummy variable indicating the specific status of the 
contenders in both of the analyzed multilevel elections: it takes the value of ‘1’ if a candidate is 
holding office at the time of the election. The argument here follows previous presidential 
coattail literature; we basically assume that the amount of available information about 
incumbents decreases voters’ need to rely upon their evaluations of presidential candidates, 
significantly attenuating the coattail effect or making it disappear entirely (Mattei and Glasgow, 
2005; Koch, 2008; Broockman, 2009). In the case of the governorship, given the existing 
regulatory disparity with respect to term limits, the incumbent condition generates a source of 
variation that necessarily needs to be controlled. The second excluded instrument is the 
Candidate Campaign Spending. We follow previous studies on presidential coattails in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 America Votes series 
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congressional elections by accounting for candidates’ effort (Born, 1984; Flemming, 1995). In 
the case of Presidential campaign spending, we use data from the Federal Election Commission. 
In the case of Gubernatorial campaign spending, we use the Gubernatorial Campaign Finance 
Database (Beyle and Jensen, 2003). Both range from 1980 to 2012 and thus, including them in 
the model relevantly decreases the number of observations. Finally, we use State Ideology as a 
common exogenous variable for both full models controlling for state specific preference 
characteristics. Berry et al.’s (2007) State Citizen Ideology measure is a 0 to 100 ideology-scale 
at state level (being 0 very conservative and 100 very liberal). 
 
4.3 Findings 
 
Table 415 presents the results of our empirical analysis at the aggregate level for Democratic 
candidates in the sample16. In order to find out whether two-sided electoral spillover effects are 
observable, both endogenous variables, which are used as the main explanatory variables in 
each estimated individual equation, should have a positive and significant effect in each other, 
respectively. 
(TABLE 4 HERE) 
 
Paradoxically, and contrary to the previously mentioned reasoning behind the process of 
separating state executive elections from the federal one after the second half of last century, we 
find no significant presidential coattail effects at the state level for the election years within our 
sample. Even if the effect remains positive across models and alternative robustness checks, this 
null finding stands in sharp contrast to the significant and positive reverse gubernatorial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Models in Table 4 were also estimated for the subset of states holding on-year Senate 
elections. While the size of the sample decreases significantly, results hold consistently across 
models. 
16 Results remain the same in the case of Republican candidates. 
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coattails on state level presidential candidates’ vote share. Results endorse the bottom-up 
hypothesis by showing how a one percent increase in the Democratic gubernatorial candidate 
vote share in one of the states with on-year elections in the sample could lead to an increase of 
0.16% in same party presidential candidate’s vote share in the same state. More relevantly, these 
results hold after accounting for other relevant sources of electoral variation at the state level. 
This is the case of average citizen ideology – the only shared exogenous variable in 
both equations – which has a statistically significant positive effect in both models. As a state 
becomes more liberal, candidates of the Democratic Party increase their vote share in that state. 
Since in our story, ideology is the connecting mechanism between voters and individual 
candidates, this result is also consistent with our expectations about reciprocal coattail effects. 
The whole idea of coattails, at least in its long-term component, is to a large extent constrained 
by the distribution of preferences in a particular electoral constituency (Campbell, 1966). 
Results are also promising regarding the instrumental independent variables: they reasonably 
raise the general confidence on the correspondence between theoretical expectations and 
empirical evidence in this paper. 
 
(TABLE 5 HERE) 
 
This seems especially clear in Table 517, where we also use candidates’ campaign 
spending as another excluded exogenous variable in order to control for various levels of 
observable campaign efforts. As it can be observed, even after the evident decrease on 
observations (181 to 102), the consistency of reverse gubernatorial electoral spillover effects 
remains. Moreover, our results on Table 5 demonstrate that the amount of dollars that 
candidates spend for their campaigns has a positive and highly significant effect on their vote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Models in Table 5 were also estimated for the subset of states holding on-year Senate 
elections. While the size of the sample decreases significantly, results hold consistently across 
models. 
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shares at both levels. As pointed out by the literature on Congressional elections, money makes 
a difference during elections, and in the context of Gubernatorial contests there is an important 
institutional variation in the amount of funding candidates can raise (Jensen and Beyle, 2003). 
More importantly, incumbency, which in Table 4 shows the biggest effect on candidates’ 
electoral results (around 11% increase in vote share in both contests), clearly decreases in Table 
5 for the case of presidential candidates while remaining stable for gubernatorial ones. The 
results stress the influence of incumbency on gubernatorial candidates’ electoral results, 
identifying a plausible explanation for the estimated limited effect of presidential coattails: the 
existing fair amount of information about local candidates as a consequence of the existing 
varying types of governor term limits, and thus, the heterogeneous levels of public exposure of 
these candidates to their constituencies18. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The relevance of the findings in this paper is twofold, providing meaningful insights for the 
study of the role of integrated parties for federal stability. 
First, it directly considers individual level explanations for straight/split ticket voting in 
simultaneous multilevel elections in the U.S. context. Given the federal structure of the 
American political system, any study focusing on the role of political parties in this 
decentralized context should first understand what shapes voters’ behavior when asked to vote 
for federal and state executive candidates at the same time. As it has been shown, consistent 
with individual level theoretical assumptions about voting behavior in the integrated parties 
model, straight voting depends, to a large extent, on simple cues, such as partisanship or 
performance evaluations. Yet, as the later part of our analysis demonstrates, the confirmatory 
aspect of this exercise does not assure the aggregate level observance of ‘two-sided’ coattail 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See the 1989-2007 What America Knows series (Pew Research) for the public knowledge 
levels of the Governors and other political figures. 
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effects. 
Second, this article adds to the growing scholar evidence demonstrating that local forces 
also shape national aggregate election outcomes to important degrees in different comparative 
federal examples (for Argentina, see Jones, 1997; for Brazil, Ames, 1994 and Samuels, 2000; 
for Germany, Hainmueller and Kern, 2008; for Mexico, Magar, 2012). Consequently, as 
reported, a successful campaign for executive office at those states with on-year gubernatorial 
elections provides a significant vote bonus at state level to the co-partisan candidate running for 
Presidency. Undoubtedly, this result presents, unavoidable challenges for the classical 
understanding of how federal policy is designed, negotiated and approved at national level, and 
reinforces the idea that politicians are mutually dependent within integrated parties. In this sense, 
the lack of significant presidential coattails in our analysis does not only suggest that the 
political decision to isolate gubernatorial elections was based on an apparently unwarranted 
electoral concern, it also shows that, consistent with literature on congressional coattails, the 
existing heterogeneity in gubernatorial term limits can actually be restricting the effect of 
presidential campaign spillovers considerably (even after controlling for campaign spending). 
So, by offering a different research context for partisan interaction, this paper provides 
an alternative test and results to Broockman’s (2009: 429) question of what leads American 
political institutions to fail to produce reverse coattails. It also opens relevant future avenues on 
the study of integrated parties’ ‘fifty-states strategies’19. What we have identified here, then, 
speaks to the fundamentals of democratic federalism by corroborating that in the United States, 
intergovernmental coordination occurs via electoral incentives of party candidates.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A ‘fifty-state strategy’ is a political plan, which aims for electoral success in all states of the 
United States, by putting resources into building an organization at the state and local levels, 
and increasing partisan awareness in areas with shortened presence. 
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FIGURE 1. Evolution of Gubernatorial Election Years by States 
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FIGURE 2. The Effect of Individual and State Level Characteristics on Straight Ticket Voting 
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FIGURE 3. Effect of Gubernatorial Approval on the predicted probability of democratic straight 
ticket voting conditional on the party of the Governor 
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FIGURE 4. The Path Diagram of the Two-Sided Coattail Effects SiEM Model 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1. Voting Strategies of New Hampshire, Utah and Vermont  
panel respondents in 2010 and 2012a 
 
 Vote Choice 
D/Db 
ST 
D/O 
TS 
R/R 
ST 
R/O 
TS O/O O/D-R Total 
Vote 
Choice 
2012 
2010c 42.97 2.89 49.17 2.89 0.82 1.23 100 
D/D 
ST 40.90 40.90 1.65 0.82 0.413 0 0.41 40.90 
D/O 
TS 2.89 1.23 0.82 .0413 0 0 0.41 2.89 
R/R 
ST 43.38 0.413 0 42.56 0.41 0 0 43.38 
R/O 
TS 4.95 0.413 0 2.47 2.06 0 0 4.95 
O/O 0.41 0 0 0 0 0.41 0 0.41 
O/D-R 4.13 0 0.41 2.898 0 0.41 0.41 4.13 
Total 100 42.97 2.89 49.17 2.89 0.82 1.23 100 
aNew Hampshire (N = 88), Utah (N = 113), and Vermont (N = 41) 
b(D = Democrat; R = Republican; O = Other; ST = Straight Ticket; TS = Ticket Splitting) 
cIn 2010, respondents’ 2008 Presidential choice is used to calculate their ticket voting strategy. 
Other/Other and Other/R-D, even if not the specific theoretical target of this paper, account for 
those strategies in which individuals choose at least one candidate who does not belong to one 
of the two major parties. 
 	    
TABLE 2. Individual-level explanations for straight ticket votinga 
Independent  
Variables 
Model 1 
Democratic 
President 2008 
Model 2 
Republican 
President 2008 
Model 3 
Democratic 
President 2012 
Model 4 
Republican 
President 2012 
Age .001 (.003) 
.004 
(.003) 
.0007 
(.003) 
-.0003 
(.0033) 
Race .198 (.143) 
.265 
(.186) 
-.018 
(.108) 
-.069 
(.168) 
Gender .088 (.095) 
-.090 
(.091) 
-.223** 
(.091) 
.089 
(.089) 
Education -.05 (.035) 
-.023 
(.033) 
-.044 
(.032) 
.046 
 (.033) 
Income .028* (.014) 
.030** 
(.015) 
.012 
(.015) 
-.004 
(.014) 
Interest .244*** (.077) 
-.09 
(.074) 
.075 
(.058) 
.145** 
(.057) 
Ideological distance 
between Governor 
and President 
- - -.024 (.027) 
-.072*** 
(.026) 
Partisanship .279*** (.033) 
.166*** 
(.028) 
.290*** 
(.034) 
.271*** 
(.031) 
Gubernatorial 
Approval 
-.370*** 
(.051) 
-.370*** 
(.047) 
-.711*** 
(.104) 
-.379*** 
(.059) 
Partisan Match -1.912*** (.390) 
-2.619*** 
(.384) 
-3.338*** 
(.334) 
-2.429*** 
(.382) 
Gubernatorial 
Approval x Partisan 
Match 
1.147*** 
(.129) 
1.242*** 
(.141) 
1.275*** 
(.119) 
.863*** 
(.123) 
Presidential 
Approval 
-.204* 
(.125) 
.293*** 
(.056) 
.189*** 
(.070) 
-.44*** 
(.088) 
Incumbency -1.083*** (.108) 
-.318*** 
(.106) 
.04 
(.105) 
-.701*** 
(.099) 
Ballot -.068 (.104) 
-.120 
(.098) 
-.431*** 
(.094) 
.187** 
(.096) 
Constant .042*** (.426) 
-.331 
(.359) 
.960** 
(.448) 
.824** 
(.375) 
Log-
pseudolikelihood -466.44 -523.02 -540.05 -566.87 
Wald χ2  315.58 225.05 261.76 318.18 
Observations 1505 1583 2159 2048 
a Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
TABLE 3. States in the analysis and Gubernatorial Term limits 
Region State Observations Limits on Governor Termsa 
NE Delaware 14 elections (1960 – 2012) 2 terms, absolute 
NE Massachusetts 2 elections (1960, 1964) Unlimited 
NE New Hampshire 14 elections (1960 – 2012) Unlimited 2 year terms 
NE Rhode Island 9 elections (1960 – 1992) Unlimited 
NE Vermont 14 elections (1960 – 2012) Unlimited 
MW Indiana 14 elections (1960 – 2012) 
Non-consecutive 4 year terms 
After 1972: 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 
years 
MW Iowa 4 elections (1960 – 1972) Unlimited 
MW Kansas 4 elections (1960 – 1972) 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 years 
MW Michigan 2 elections (1960, 1964) Unlimited 
MW Minnesota 1 election (1960) Unlimited 
MW Nebraska 2 elections (1960, 1964) Unlimited 
MW Missouri 14 elections (1960 – 2012) 2 terms, absolute 
MW North Dakota 14 elections (1960 – 2012) Unlimited 
MW South Dakota 4 elections (1960 – 1972) 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 years 
MW Wisconsin 3 elections (1960 – 1968) Unlimited 
S Arkansas 7 elections (1960 – 1984) Unlimited 
S Florida 2 elections (1960, 1964) 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 years 
S Louisiana 4 elections (1960 – 1972) 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 years 
S North Carolina 14 elections (1960 – 2012) 
1 term, absolute 
After 1972: 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 
years 
S Texas 4 elections (1960 – 1972) Unlimited 
S West Virginia 14 elections (1960 – 2012) 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 years 
W Arizona 3 elections (1960 – 1968) Unlimited 
W Montana 14 elections (1960 – 2012) 
Unlimited 
After 1993: 2 terms, re-eligible after 8 
years 
W New Mexico 3 elections (1960 – 1968) 2 terms, re-eligible after 4 years 
W Washington 14 elections (1960 – 2012) Unlimited 
W Utah 14 elections (1960 – 2012) Unlimited 
a At the time of the observation. Source: The Book of the States. 
 
 
 
 
  
aNote: N = 181. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (one-tailed test) 
 
  
 
TABLE 4. Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Model with Robust St. Errors 
(Democratic Vote)a 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
Vote Percentage 
(Gubernatorial) 
Model 2 
Vote Percentage 
(Presidential) 
Vote Percentage (Presidential) .0909 (.1182)  
Vote Percentage (Gubernatorial) t-1 
.2479*** 
(.0655)  
Incumbent Gubernatorial Candidate 10.87*** (1.6342)  
State Ideology .0271 (.0671) 
.290*** 
(.032) 
Vote Percentage (Gubernatorial)   .162* (.098) 
Vote Percentage (Presidential) t-1  .274*** (.055) 
Incumbent Presidential Candidate  10.49*** (1.244) 
constant 32.032*** (5.403) 
7.319* 
(4.768) 
Adjusted R2  .332 .576 
1st stage partial R2 .3813 .3174 
Minimum eigenvalue 53.93 40.69 
Sargan test .0019 .0248 
aNote: N = 102. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(One-tailed test) 
 
TABLE 5. Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Model with Robust 
St. Errors (Democratic Vote)a 
Independent Variables 
Model 3 
Vote Percentage 
(Gubernatorial) 
Model 4 
Vote Percentage 
(Presidential) 
Vote Percentage (Presidential) .0017 (.214)  
Vote Percentage (Gubernatorial) t-1 
.150** 
(.085)  
Incumbent Gubernatorial Candidate 11.09*** (2.132)  
Gubernatorial Candidate Campaign 
Spending (logged) 
2.705*** 
(.857)  
State Ideology .143* (.087) 
.203*** 
(.037) 
Vote Percentage (Gubernatorial)   .121* (.088) 
Vote Percentage (Presidential) t-1  .480*** (.066) 
Incumbent Presidential Candidate  2.321** (1.305) 
Presidential Candidate Campaign 
Spending (logged)  
1.260*** 
(.499) 
constant -7.614 (11.378) 
-17.98** 
(9.802) 
Adjusted R2 
1st stage partial R2 
.427 
.3936 
.650 
.3816 
Minimum eigenvalue 20.33 19.33 
Sargan test 5.50 1.61 
